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Abstract 
There is considerable concern that the public are not getting the message about 
climate change.  One possible explanation is ‘optimism bias’, where individuals 
overestimate the likelihood of positive events happening to them and underestimate 
the likelihood of negative events.  Evidence from behavioural neuroscience suggest 
that this bias is underpinned by selective information processing, specifically through 
a reduced level of neural coding of undesirable information, and an unconscious 
tendency for optimists to avoid fixating negative information.   Here we test how this 
bias in attention could relate to the processing of climate change messages.  Using eye 
tracking, we found that level of dispositional optimism affected visual fixations on 
climate change messages.  Optimists spent less time (overall dwell time) attending to 
any arguments about climate changes (either ‘for’ or ‘against’) with substantially 
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shorter individual fixations on aspects of arguments for climate change, i.e. those that 
reflect the scientific consensus but are bad news. We also found that when asked to 
summarise what they had read, non-optimists were more likely to frame their recall in 
terms of the arguments ‘for’ climate change; optimists were significantly more likely 
to frame it in terms of a debate between two opposing positions.  Those highest in 
dispositional optimism seemeed to have the strongest and most pronounced level of 
optimism bias when it came to estimating the probability of being personally affected 
by climate change.  We discuss the importance of overcoming this cognitive bias to 
develop more effective strategies for communicating about climate change.   
 
 
Introduction 
The scientific evidence for climate change, its causes and consequences, is 
overwhelming.  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has 
carefully reviewed the evidence around climate change in a succession of reports and 
its conclusions are that they are ‘now 95 percent certain that humans are the main 
cause of current global warming.’ (IPCC 2015: v; italics added).  The extreme 
seriousness of this threat and its global effects has been detailed by the IPCC in a 
series of reports (IPCC 2014; 2015).  They conclude that a rise in global temperature 
will have ‘severe and widespread impacts on… substantial species extinctions, large 
risks to global and regional food security…growing food or working outdoors’ as well 
as producing more extreme fluctuations in weather, including droughts, flooding and 
storms  (IPCC, 2014, p.14).  However, although the role of human activity in its 
causation is both ‘clear and growing’ (IPCC 2015: v), evidence for large-scale 
behavioural adaptation is unfortunately absent (see Beattie 2010; Marshall 2015). 
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There has been scientific evidence for the role of human activity in producing 
increased greenhouse gas emissions and climate change for a significant period.  
Indeed, as far back as 1896 the Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius calculated the 
possible effects of doubling the amount of carbon dioxide on global temperatures.  In 
1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Scientific Advisory Council warned that the 
constant increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide could ‘modify the heat balance of the 
atmosphere’ (see also Marshall 2015: 63).  In the U.K., the Stern Review (conducted 
by Sir Nicholas Stern the former chief economist of the World Bank) concluded over 
a decade ago that ‘climate change presents very serious global risks, and it demands 
an urgent global response.’ (Stern Review, 2006, p.i).  Stern’s conclusion was that 
‘Climate change threatens the basic elements of life for people around the world – 
access to water, food production, health, and use of land and the environment’ (2006, 
p. iii).  Stern also made it clear that it is extremely probable that human activity and 
particularly patterns of consumption and energy use, driven by consumer demand for 
higher standards of living, are significant factors in the rise of global CO2 emissions, 
and therefore a major driver of climate change.  He argued that ‘Emissions have been, 
and continue to be, driven by economic growth’ (2006, p.xi), a view subsequently 
supported by a number of IPCC reports. 
Strong, indeed incontrovertible, evidence has been available for some time, so 
why has this urgent global response still not occurred?  Indeed, why is there currently 
no suggestion that this ‘global response’ is even on the horizon?  Policies to limit 
greenhouse gases emissions and engage sustainable development, combined with 
individual reduction in the use of fossil fuels would all significantly help to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and prevent further global warming (IPCC 2015). Indeed, 
the IPCC (2015) have argued that we could limit the effects of climate change by 
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changing our individual and collective behaviour and by taking action now. We could 
use public transport rather than private vehicles (Wall, Devine-Wright and Mill 2007), 
increase recycling (Elgaaied 2012) or alter our patterns of choice as consumers to 
approach a more carbon-neutral purchasing pattern (Walker and King 2008). 
Consumer choice of low carbon products would then influence the production process 
with further significant effects on greenhouse gases (Beattie 2010). There are many 
things that we could do, and there has been significant local change but nothing like 
the ‘global response’ that Stern said was required to ameliorate the further deleterious 
effects of climate change (Power, Beattie and McGuire in press). 
This inaction by consumers is clearly manifest in a very revealing statistic 
reported by a leading multinational, Unilever, in their ‘Sustainable Living Plan’.  
They outline how they aim to halve the greenhouse gas impact of their products 
across the lifecycle by 2020 (2013: 16).  To achieve this goal, they reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions from their manufacturing chain and deforestation.  They 
opted for more environmentally friendly sourcing of raw materials, doubled their use 
of renewable energy, and produced concentrated liquids and powders.  They reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions from transport and from refrigeration.  They also restricted 
employee travel.  The result of all of these initiatives was that their ‘greenhouse gas 
footprint impact per consumer….increased by around 5% since 2010’ (2013: 16).  
They concluded: ‘We have made good progress in those areas under our control 
but…the big challenges are those areas not under our direct control like…..consumer 
behaviour’ (2013:16).  It would seem that consumers are not ‘getting the message’ - 
they are not opting for the low carbon alternatives in the way envisaged, they are not 
reducing the length of their showers (to reduce energy and water consumption), and 
they are not breaking their high carbon habits.  The question is why. 
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  This failure on the part of the public to alter their behaviour is perhaps even 
more puzzling given that The Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
in the U.K. (DEFRA) have repeatedly argued that ‘Many people are willing to do a bit 
more to limit their environmental impact, yet people have a much lower level of 
understanding about what they can do and what would make a difference’ (DEFRA 
2007).  The Unilever campaign was, of course, designed to help in this regard by 
making more sustainable products readily available.  There have been a number of 
other government-backed campaigns in the U.K. designed to persuade us to change 
our behaviour as consumers – to turn off lights when not in use, to recycle, to buy 
alternative products with lower carbon footprint, to travel by car less and take fewer 
long-haul flights etc. (see, for example, Act on CO2  2010;   World Wildlife Fund 
2008).  These are all relatively clearly defined actions, which could make a significant 
difference if enough people did them, but the results generally have been very 
disappointing (Beattie 2010).  Take, for example, the issue of low carbon alternatives 
and consumer choice.  Tesco, the U.K. based retailer, introduced carbon labelling to 
guide consumers towards the more environmentally friendly alternative in 2007, 
aiming to include carbon labels on all of its 70,000 own-brand products.  Terry Leahy, 
CEO of Tesco at that time said ‘The green movement must become a mass movement 
in green consumption’ and to achieve this goal, Leahy argued ‘we must empower 
everyone – not just the enlightened or the affluent’ (Leahy 2007).  The results, 
however, in terms of actual sales were not as anticipated.  Indeed, Tesco dropped this 
plan in 2012 because they argued other supermarkets had not joined them in this 
enterprise, and they also said that the accurate calculation of carbon footprint for 
products was both slower and far more expensive than they had originally anticipated.  
However, another major issue was that when products were labelled in this way, 
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consumers were not using them to guide their actual choice of the low carbon 
alternatives.  In a controlled experimental situation, Beattie (2012) reported that 
people paid very little attention to the carbon labels, especially on the products with 
the higher carbon footprint – the ‘bad news products’.  Using eye tracking to monitor 
individual gaze fixations on products with carbon footprint labels every forty 
milliseconds, Beattie, McGuire and Sale (2010) reported that in less than 7% of all 
cases did participants fixate first on either the carbon-footprint icon or the 
accompanying carbon-footprint information, as opposed to brand information, price, 
energy use, details of product etc.  These latter features were all much more salient to 
individuals (see McGuire and Beattie 2016).  Thus, consumers in the UK were not 
responding in the way anticipated by both government and major retailers, after 
numerous government-led campaigns and significant publicity and media coverage 
about the issue.    
Of course, from a psychological perspective there are a range of possible 
theoretical reasons why this might be the case.  For example, the public might not 
have the right attitude to climate change after all, contrary to what DEFRA and others 
hypothesised (Beattie 2010; Beattie and Sale 2009, 2011).  Consumers might be 
leaving it to others to change their behaviour (Beattie and McGuire 2014).  Consumer 
habits might be too ingrained and too difficult to break easily (Ulph and Southerton 
2014).  Consumers in rich Western countries might assume that they are safe and that 
it is only poorer countries that will be affected, at least in the first instance (a view 
bolstered by the evidence in the Stern Review, p.vii).  We will consider this so-called 
‘optimism bias’ in more detail below. The public generally might not be inclined to 
look that far into the future to imagine possible effects (Beattie 2010). They might be 
confused by the whole climate change ‘debate’, and the contrary arguments that 
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humans have only a limited (or no) role in the rise of global temperatures.  It has, 
however, been pointed out that some of those who have been most vociferous in 
raising objections to the scientific evidence may have a particular (financial) stake in 
the matter; this includes the oil lobby (see Oreskes and Conway 2010). 
 
Optimism and cognitive processing 
However, there is a more basic hypothesis to explain this lack of action on the 
part of the public.  What happens if people do not ‘see’ the arguments for climate 
change in the first place?  What happens if selective perception is at work here?  The 
arguments about climate change are, after all, very pessimistic – in Stern’s words ‘it 
threatens the basic elements of life for people around the world’.  These are worse 
than pessimistic, they are cataclysmic, and the available scientific evidence makes this 
more compelling and therefore even more depressing.  Information about climate 
change has been reproduced endlessly in newspapers, television and film, which can 
influence people’s attitudes and cognitions when they are viewed (Beattie, McGuire 
and Sale 2011).  However, what happens if people avoid seeing them?  What happens 
if people attend instead to arguments against climate change?  These, by definition, 
do present a much rosier picture of both the present and of the future (‘there is 
actually significant doubt about anthropogenic climate change and your current 
lifestyle is totally acceptable’).  
  So what does affect whether we see the arguments for climate change or not?  
This question could be critical for understanding the effectiveness of any forms of 
communication about climate change.  There is evidence from a number of other 
domains, including health, well-being, relationships and enrepreneurial success 
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(Isaacowitz 2006; Seligman 2002) to suggest that some people do have a bias in the 
processing of, and the reasoning about, positive and negative information, and that 
this bias links to one major individual difference, namely ‘dispositional optimism’.  
Dispositional optimism ‘refers to generalized outcome expectancies that good things, 
rather than bad things, will happen; pessimism refers to the tendency to expect 
negative outcomes in the future’ (Taylor 1998).  Seligman (2002) has argued that 
optimists and pessimists differ in terms of a number of basic psychological features, 
including attributional style.  Attributional style refers to consistent patterns in our 
automatic thinking when we try to understand the causes of various events.  Seligman 
maintains that this is a primitive aspect of psychological functioning as we try to 
understand why things have occurred.  It is a core part of making sense of, and giving 
meaning to, our social worlds.  He has argued that ‘Optimistic people explain good 
events in terms of permanent causes such as traits and abilities.  Pessimists name 
transient causes, such as moods and effort’ (emphasis added) (Seligman 2002: 89).  
Optimists, on the other hand, explain bad events in terms of transient features, 
pessimists explain bad events in terms of more enduring causes. In other words, if 
something goes well (say passing an examination), optimists assume that the cause is 
long lasting and they will attribute it (in terms of their automatic thinking) to 
something to do with themselves (their underlying characteristics or ability – ‘I am 
clever’).  They will assume that it will be there in the future (‘permanent’) and affect 
many aspects of their lives (‘pervasive’); after all our innate ability is fairly enduring.  
If something goes badly, optimists will assume that the cause is transient; they will 
attribute it to something that will pass (‘I was tired’; ‘the exam was too hard’).  They 
will assume that it will not be there in the future (‘temporary’) and be limited to 
specific aspects of their life (‘specific’).  Pessimists, on the other hand, make quite 
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different attributions for success and failure.  If something goes well, pessimists 
attribute this to transient causes (‘I passed the exam but I got lucky’; ‘it was easy’ 
etc.); however, failures are ascribed to permanent causes (‘I failed the exam because I 
am stupid’). 
Attributional reasoning, according to Seligman (2002) and others, underpins 
our everyday social life.  It is sense-making in action and leads to crucial expectations 
about the future.  It has a major effect on both our mental and physical health 
(Seligman 2002) - optimists live significantly longer than pessimists, and are much 
less likely to die from cardiac arrest (Scheier et al. 1989); it also increases the survival 
time after a diagnosis of cancer (Schulz et al. 1996).  Optimism does this by reducing 
stress and anxiety about the future, and optimists consequently have better immune 
functioning (Segerstrom, Taylor, Kemeny and Fahey 1998).  It has been argued that 
optimism was selected for during evolution (Mosing, Zietsch, Shekar, Wright and 
Martin 2009).   
However, there may be another psychological factor that also distinguishes 
optimists and pessimists.  Attributional style is reasoning about the causes of events 
(the ‘why’) but what about the perception of any such events in the first place (the 
‘what’).  Could this also distinguish optimists and pessimists?  Isaacowitz (2006) has 
argued that dispositional optimism does affect basic perceptual processes with 
optimists quite literally look on the bright side of life.  He used an eye-tracking 
procedure to investigate this, tracking individual gaze fixations, when participants 
looked variously at images of skin cancer, line drawings with the same shape as the 
cancer images, and neutral faces.  He selected images of skin cancer because they are 
clearly ‘negative’ images, being both unpleasant and graphic.  He found that young 
adults high in dispositional optimism fixated less on these skin-cancer images than 
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their less optimistic peers (Isaacowitz 2006: 68).  In other words, Isaacowitz claims 
that adult gaze preferences ‘towards positive and away from negative images suggest 
that gaze patterns may reflect an underlying motivation to regulate emotions and to 
feel good.’ (Isaacowitz 2006: 69).  Luo and Isaacowitz (2007) also reported negative 
(but non-significant) relationships between dispositional optimism and eye-gaze to 
both negative and neutral text about skin cancer. The negative correlation suggests 
that optimists may read information about a negative topic more quickly than do 
pessimists.  Other research has shown that individual differences in mood are indeed 
associated with attentional bias to certain stimuli. Individuals suffering from anxiety 
or depression have attentional biases toward negative information (Bradley, Moog 
and Lee 1997; Mathews and MacLeod 2002). Attentional bias to certain affective 
stimuli appears to be motivated by the need to self-regulate emotion, or maintain 
one’s positive mood state (Wegener 1994). Attention away from negative images may 
help individuals prolong their positive mood.  Participants who are instructed to 
regulate their emotions (Xing and Isaacowitz 2006) or trained to self-regulate 
emotions by attending to positive stimuli (Wadlinger 2008) also showed an attentional 
bias by looking less at negative stimuli.  
Therefore, according to Isaacowitz (2006) and Seligman (2002) optimists have 
distinct cognitive ‘strategies’, involving both attributional reasoning and attentional 
bias, for staying optimistic.  At the level of the individual this might be a very good 
thing (Harker and Keltner 2001), and as a consequence, strategies for becoming and 
remaining optmistic have been trained on a very large scale through both cognitive 
behavioural therapy (CBT) and the self-help industry (see Beattie 2011).  However, 
what may be good for the individual, may be less good for society as a whole. 
Ehrenreich (2009) has argued that high levels of optimism (either dispositional or 
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learned) have ‘undermined preparedness’ to deal with real threats, including 9/11, the 
economic bubble bursting, world terrorism etc.  ‘The truth is that Americans had been 
working hard for decades to school themselves in the techniques of positive thinking, 
and these included the reflexive capacity for dismissing disturbing news’ (Ehrenreich, 
2009:10).  The economic crisis, she argues, is a case in point (‘imagining an 
invulnerable nation and an ever-booming economy - there was simply no ability or 
inclination to imagine the worst’ (Ehrenreich 2009:11).  Ehrenreich has argued that 
the problem was that ‘professional optimists dominated the world of economic 
commentary’ (Ehrenreich 2009:181) and that some people who had managed to 
anticipate the forthcoming economic disaster ‘had been under pressure over the years 
to improve their attitude’ (Ehrenreich 2009: 181).  Shiller (2000) had also warned that 
‘wishful thinking on the part of investors …blinds us to the truth of our situation.’ 
This is the downside of optimism, the fact that people may not notice those warning 
signs that are available and that a focus on the negative is actually an important aspect 
of human survival. 
One very significant question is whether optimists may be missing some of the 
crucial signs of climate change because they are avoiding seeing them.  There is some 
evidence for this.  Optimism bias has been found for climate change in that 
individuals perceive climate change to be less of a risk to themselves, but the utmost 
risk to the environment (Costa-Font, Mossialos and Rudisill 2009).  Attentional bias 
has been found to extend to the self-selection of information.  One survey found that 
having positive or negative emotions about climate change was differentially related 
to information-seeking and avoidance behaviours (Yang and Kahlor 2012).  People 
who felt excited, hopeful and happy about climate change were more likely to avoid 
or ignore information about climate change.  Positive emotions about climate change 
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were not related to behavioural intentions to seek out information about climate 
change.  In contrast, individuals who reported feeling concerned, worried and anxious 
about climate change were less likely to avoid information about climate change, and 
more likely seek out such information (Yang and Kahlor 2012).  Beattie et al (2010) 
had found that experimental participants do fixate on the carbon footprint of specific 
products like low energy light bulbs, where, of course, the information about carbon 
footprint is positive, rather than on the carbon footprint of products where the 
information is going to be obviously higher (like detergent). 
However, there is one counter study here.  Beattie and McGuire (2011) did not 
find any evidence of an attentional bias in optimists away from negative iconic 
images of climate change, when these were presented on a computer screen alongside 
positive images of nature and images of neutral objects.  Indeed, the negative images 
of climate change were fixated more by optimists than by pessimists.  However, these 
iconic images of climate change may have differed in a number of ways to the 
alternative  images as well as just on the positive-negative dimension.  The iconic 
images of climate change (e.g. polar bears on ice floes, Manhattan under water, 
deserts, a tsunami crashing against a tropical shore) (Beattie and McGuire 2011: 245) 
might have conjured up images of challenge and adventure rather than just 
straightforward negative affect.  One might recall that the image used to advertise the 
Hollywood movie ‘The Day after Tomorrow’ (2004) depicting New York in the wake 
of climate change was the Statue of Liberty barely visible through the changed 
landscape.  This iconic image of climate change was used to promote an adventure 
movie.  Furthermore, there is an argument that optimism is a valuable psychological 
state because in common with other positive emotions it acts to ‘broaden individuals’ 
momentary thought-action repertoires, prompting them to pursue a wider range of 
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thoughts and actions than is typical’ (Fredrickson and Branigan 2005). Optimists in 
this previous study could have been focussing on the ‘challenging’ iconic images of 
climate change because they are interested in more divergent action against it.  Such 
negative images may represent a challenge rather than just merely representing ‘bad 
news’ like the images of skin cancer.   
Furthermore, iconic images of climate change are just one type of 
‘communication’ about this global phenomenon and we clearly need to recognise that 
despite their clear ‘iconicity’, such images have complex psychological and emotional 
effects on us (Barthes 1957).  Iconic representations, be they in the form of everyday 
gestural communications or codified and recognisable photos, are also likely to be 
subject to multiple individual interpretations at both the conscious and unconscious 
levels (Beattie and Shovelton 1999a,b; Beattie 2016).  One important question 
(amongst many) is how would level of dispositional optimism relate to attentional 
focus to more substantive climate change messages? Would it affect what people 
attend to, and even how they remember these messages?  This is the focus of the 
current research. 
 
Optimism bias and its antecedents 
But there is another important consideration here.  How might dispositional 
optimism affect so-called optimism bias, which has been reported frequently in the 
psychological literature, and may be particularly relevant to climate change? The 
potential relationship between dispositional optimism and optimism bias is an 
extremely important issue (especially given that we have been training people using 
CBT to become more optimistic) that is relatively under-explored in the literature 
(many use the terms ‘optimism’ and ‘optimistic bias’ more or less interchangeably 
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without proper evidence).  Optimism bias is extremely important because it is so rife.  
Many of us (estimated at around 80%) apparently suffer from some form of optimism 
bias (Sharot 2012) – believing that our marriages will work (Baker and Emery 1993), 
our start-up businesses will succeed (Bracha and Brown 2012), and that we will have 
a long and fulfilling life compared to everyone else (Weinstein 1980).  This sort of 
unrealistic optimism (after all, we all cannot be better than the average) would seem 
to be pervasive, affecting not just our personal relationships but also our attitudes to 
finance, work and health.  For example, adolescent smokers are two and a half times 
more likely than non-smokers to doubt that they would ever die from smoking even if 
they smoked for thirty of forty years; adult smokers are three times more likely to 
believe this (Arnett 2000). 
Optimism bias has been found across a range of environmental issues (Gifford et 
al. 2009), as well as in estimates of the risk of health damage from specific 
environmental hazards, like water pollution (Pahl, Harris, Todd and Rutter 2005), and 
with climate change (Gifford 2011).  A large 18-nation survey demonstrated that 
individuals believe that across a number of environmental issues they are safer than 
others living elsewhere (‘spatial bias’) and that they are safer than future generations 
(‘temporal bias’) (Gifford et al. 2009).  Indeed, optimism bias is one of the most 
consistent cognitive biases documented in both psychology and behavioural 
economics.  Could it help explain why the public generally seem less concerned about 
climate change than they should be, and why they are not doing enough to ameliorate 
the effects of climate change?  In addition, is level of dispositional optimism a 
contributory factor here? 
The public do know about climate change and report some knowledge of the 
factors behind it.  Thus, the British Social Attitudes survey (2012) in the U.K. 
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revealed that 76% of people ‘believe climate change is happening and that humans 
are, at least partly, responsible.’  However, research in the U.S. has shown that 
knowledge does not necessarily equate to actual concern (Kellstedt, Zahran and 
Vedlitz 2008).   So could an increased understanding of the mechanisms that sustain 
optimism help us consider new ways of reaching this clearly over-optimistic public? 
Optimism bias appears to be associated with specific cognitive biases in 
processing relevant information. One study in behavioural neuroscience used 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (FMRI) to measure brain activity as 
participants estimated their probability of experiencing a range of negative life events, 
including things like Alzheimer’s and burglary (Sharot, Kom and Dolan 2011).  After 
each individual trial, participants were presented with the average probability of that 
event occurring to someone like him or herself.  How did this new information affect 
their estimate of it happening to them?  The researchers found that their participants 
were significantly more likely to change their estimate only if the new information 
was better than they had originally anticipated.  This bias was reflected in their FMRI 
data in that optimism was related to a reduced level of neural coding of more negative 
than anticipated information about the future in the critical region of the frontal cortex 
(right inferior prefrontal gyrus).   They also found that those participants highest in 
dispositional optimism were significantly worse at tracking this new negative 
information in this region, compared to those who were lower in dispositional 
optimism.  In other words, optimism bias derives partly from a failure to learn 
systematically from new undesirable information and this bias is most pronounced 
with those highest in dispositional optimism. 
However, as we have already discussed there may well be other biases 
associated with how optimists process relevant information about the world in 
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addition to the learning bias identified by Sharot and her colleagues (in other words 
other biases which could affect ‘perception’ as well as ‘learning’).  Isaacowitz’s 
(2006) research clearly demonstrates this.  Similarly, the emotional Stroop task, where 
participants have to name the ink colours of a list of words varying in emotional 
valence (and ignore the meanings of the words), reveals that highly optimistic 
individuals have an unconscious, automatic attentional bias to positive stimuli than 
negative stimuli (Segerstrom 2001).  They show maximum interference to positive 
stimuli resulting in longer latencies to respond in the Stroop task (Segerstrom 2001).  
Pessimists, on the other hand, have an attentional bias for negative stimuli 
(Segerstrom 2001). Optimists may end up with a rosier picture of the world because 
of this automatic biased pattern of visual attention. 
Optimism may be highly advantageous for the individual, as we have 
discussed.  Belief in a positive future also encourages individuals (in some domains, 
particularly those that they have some control over) to behave in ways that can 
actually contribute to this positive future, thus becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy 
(Sharot 2011).  However, although underestimating future negative life events can 
reduce stress and add to our longevity, sometimes negative events really do need to be 
considered.  Hence, optimism bias can have very significant deleterious consequences 
particularly regarding the discounting of serious risk.  If we underestimate the risks of 
something like smoking, we may be much less likely to try to change our behaviour 
and stop smoking, and less likely to engage in basic preventative behaviours and 
avoid it in the first place.   
 
Rationale for the present study 
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Optimism bias could be particularly relevant to issues to do with climate 
change.  If we underestimate the probability of the negative effects of climate change 
happening to us, we may be much less likely to engage in mitigation behaviour, or 
sacrifice many of the things we currently value (foreign holidays, big cars, and high 
carbon lifestyles) to reduce the risks associated with climate change (Bracha and 
Brown 2008).  But how might we gain insights into cognitive biases in the area of 
climate change?  We cannot present participants with the actual outcome data (as was 
done in the Sharot study) to see how they update their own estimates in the light of 
this because the catastrophic consequences of climate change are still largely in the 
future.  However, could the research on biased patterns of attention provide us with 
any new insights here?   Does the evidence of differential focus on positive images by 
optimists in the Isaacowitz study have any relevance for how individuals attend to 
more serious substantive messages about climate change, as opposed to just drawings 
and images?  We have been bombarded with information by high profile and credible 
organisations like the IPCC, governments and NGOs, but are there cognitive biases in 
how this information is being attended to and do any such biases connect to 
underlying dispositiona optimism?   Here we conduct two studies.  Study 1 examines 
the relationship between level of dispositional optimism and the processing of climate 
change messages.  Study 2 examines the relationship between level of dispositional 
optimism and the extent of optimism bias.  
  In Study 1, we employ an eye-tracker to record eye movement behaviour to 
reveal online visual and cognitive processing when participants are presented with 
climate change messages.  It has long been established that eye movement behaviour 
can be linked to cognitive processing in a range of tasks (e.g., Buswell 1922; Just and 
Carpenter 1976; Rayner 1978, 1998;Yarbus 1967), and we know more about eye 
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movements involved in reading than in any other cognitive task (for a review, see 
Rayner 2009).  On average, we read around 330 words per minute (Rayner, Well, 
Pollatsek, and Bertera 1982), and to achieve this large amount of information 
processing we rapidly move our eyes forward through the text between 3-5 times per 
second (Rayner, Pollatsek, Ashby, and Clifton 2012).  Our eye movement behaviour 
largely consists of the actual eye movements (also known as saccades) and the periods 
in which are eyes are not moving, but are relatively fixated in position.  Research 
shows that very little information is processed during saccades (known as ‘saccadic 
suppression’, Matin 1974), and that instead it is during fixations that visual and 
cognitive processing takes place, such as word identification and semantic processing. 
Evidence of this processing can also be seen in the durations of each fixation.  The 
average fixation duration is approximately 200-250ms, but there are numerous factors 
that can influence fixation duration (Just and Carpenter 1980). One of the strongest 
contributors to fixation duration is the familiarity of a word (i.e., word frequency). 
Rare words are fixated longer, whereas more familiar words are fixated for a shorter 
duration, or sometimes skipped altogether.  Word length also affects fixation duration 
and the likelihood of word skipping, with longer words being associated with 
increased fixation durations and are less likely to be skipped compared to shorter 
words.  In addition, as one would expect, it is generally the case that the more difficult 
the text, the slower the reading rate.  However, on a more fine-grained level, increased 
difficulty of the text can also lead to longer fixation durations, smaller saccades, and 
an increase in regressive saccades (Scheier et al. 2012). 
Extensive research on eye movement behaviour (cf. Rayner et al. 2012) 
suggests that although reading is largely a case of processing information word-by-
word, there is more to reading than just identifying a word and moving on to the next 
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word.  Words need to be comprehended within their context of the sentences, and the 
reader needs to extract the meaning out of successive sentences and parse these 
sentences together to process the discourse of the text.  To understand the discourse of 
the text may require the reader to draw on knowledge about the topic and to 
understand what the text is trying to convey.  For example, the reader will need to 
establish what the text is trying to describe or suggest, and judge whether they 
believes the claims that the text may make.  Taken together, discourse comprehension 
is an active process in which the reader’s individual prior knowledge, perspective on 
the situation, moods, attitudes and intentions may influence how the message of the 
text is perceived (see, for example, Bower 1978).  In Study 1, we investigate 
experimentally whether dispositional optimism affects patterns of fixation.  Optimists 
manage to maintain a positive focus in life, the question that we pose here is whether 
this is partly attributable to reduced processing of negative information driven by a 
desire to maintain a positive outlook?  Could this help explain the apparent failure of 
many climate change communications?  
 
Study 1: 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were a sample of university staff and students from the North 
West of England.  They received £6 for taking part.  Ethical approval was obtained 
from the University Human Research Ethics Committee (UREC).  We recruited 45 
participants (65.2% female) for the study.  Basic demographic information, including 
whether they were a member of an environmental group was collected.  The mean age 
was 29.9 (range 18-63 years).  The age, gender and environmental membership of our 
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participants, as well as their familiarity with the topics of the climate change articles 
were all noted.  There were no significant differences between optimists and non-
optimists on any of these variables.  Three participants were unable to have their eye 
movements tracked and excluded from this study.  Participants were randomly 
assigned to a recall or no recall condition.   
Materials 
The materials consisted of a practice text (about asthma) and three articles 
about (1) climate change in general, (2) climate change and its relation to flooding in 
the UK, (3) climate change and its consequences for food scarcity and violent 
conflict.  Texts of all four articles can be found in the Supplementary Material. 
Each climate change article contained 3 arguments for climate change (‘for’) 
and 3 arguments against climate change (‘against’).  ‘For’ arguments were that 
climate change is real, human activity is the cause of both climate change generally 
and flooding in the UK, and predictions that climate change will cause food scarcity 
and conflict. ‘Against’ arguments were that climate change is not occurring or is 
exaggerated, that it is not caused by human activity, that flooding in the UK is not 
caused by climate change, and that there is no link between climate and food scarcity 
and conflict.  All arguments were drawn from print and electronic media (e.g. The 
Guardian, BBC News website etc.) and online blogs. ‘For’ arguments came from 
news articles summarizing the findings detailed in the IPCC 2014 report about climate 
change. ‘For’ and ‘against’ arguments were edited such that they were of similar word 
count and frequency. There were no significant differences on average word 
frequency, word count or word length between ‘for’ and ‘against’ arguments within 
each article, as well as the average of all ‘for’ and ‘against’ arguments for all articles. 
The three articles were of similar length (mean of 388 words; range: 363-405). 
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Measures 
The independent variable, the 10-item Life Orientation Test - Revised (LOT-
R) was used to measure dispositional optimism and we divided our participants (using 
a median split) into optimists (LOT-R score 16.55, SD = 2.37, range 17-22) and non-
optimists (LOT-R score 10.45, SD = 2.65, range 3-14).  Familiarity with the topic of 
article was assessed with a single item measure: ‘How familiar are you with the topic 
described in the text you just read?’ on a 5-point scale (1 = ‘I have never heard about 
this topic before’; 5 = ‘I am very familiar with this topic’) (Kaakinen and Hyönä 
2005).  
Three dependent variables were used to assess attention: fixation count 
(number of individual eye gaze fixations), average fixation duration and dwell time, 
the total duration of all fixations within an AOI (an overall measure of reading time). 
The text of ‘for’ and ‘against’ arguments were grouped into Areas of Interest (AOI).  
 
Procedure 
Eye movements were captured with an Eyelink 1000 (SR Research) desktop 
eye-tracker.  The sampling rate was 1000hz.  Articles were presented on a 19” CRT 
(150Hz), with a resolution 800x600.  Participants were seated 57cm in front of the eye 
tracker with a chin-rest to observe the stimulus material on a computer monitor.  The 
eye-tracker infrared camera determines the participant’s point of gaze on the screen. 
 Viewing was binocular, but only one eye was recorded. 
The eye-tracking experiment began with a standard 9-point calibration 
procedure, which was repeated after reading each article.  Only calibrations with an 
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average calibration error < 0.5° were accepted.  All texts were presented in Arial font 
with identical font size (16), line spacing (1.5), and left-justification, as this was the 
default settings for text reading in the Eyelink 1000.  Due to the font size and word 
limit restrictions of 150 words per page, text from each article was displayed over 
three ‘pages’ or screens.  For the three climate change articles, each ‘page’ contained 
one ‘for’ and one ‘against’ argument.  Presentation of ‘for’ and ‘against’ paragraphs 
differed by article.  ‘Against’ arguments were the first paragraph on the screen for the 
‘General climate change’ article.  For the ‘Flooding’ and ‘Food Scarcity and Conflict’ 
climate change articles ‘for’ arguments were the first paragraph on the screen.  To 
start reading, participants looked at a fixation point in the top-left corner of the screen 
and pressed the spacebar. The fixation page was replaced with the first page of an 
article.  After they had finished reading the first page, participants pressed the 
spacebar to proceed to the fixation point page.  This procedure was repeated to read 
the second and third pages of text. The spacebar presses started recording of the eye-
tracker.  Participants read the practice article to familiarize themselves with the 
procedure.  After the calibration was repeated, participants then read the three climate 
change articles. Presentation of climate change article were randomized.  After 
reading each article in the recall condition participants were asked to verbally recall 
what they had just read to the experimenter  (Kaakinen and Hyönä 2005; Kretzschmar 
et al. 2013).  
 
Results  
Rationale for statistical analyses 
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Normality was assessed prior to analysis within the optimist and non-optimist groups. 
Within each group, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test was non-significant for all 6 
eye movement outcome variables indicating normal distribution. The assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was met in all 2*2 factorial ANOVA analyses.  
Analysis of the number of ‘for’ and ‘against’ arguments recalled was 
conducted for the recall condition only (n = 20). A median split with ties to the mean 
was conducted for this subsample; ten recall participants were in each group. 
Normality was assessed within each group with the K-S test. The number of ‘for’ 
arguments recalled by optimists was not normally distributed, D(10) = .278, p = .03. 
Recall of ‘for’ arguments for both groups, as well as recall of ‘against’ arguments for 
non-optimists were non-significant, indicating normal distribution. Consequently, 
independent samples t-test were conducted for recall of ‘for’ arguments and a Mann-
Whitney-U test conducted for recall of ‘against’ arguments between optimists and 
non-optimists.   
Content analysis was used to analyse the transcripts of recall participants. 
Analyses of recall transcripts were scored for the number of ‘for’ and ‘against’ 
propositions correctly recalled as well as more detailed analyses on how the recalled 
gist information was framed (Bransford and Franks 1972). 
 
Eye tracking 
The individual scan paths of two participants (an optimist and a non-optimist) 
are displayed below as they read arguments both ‘against’ and ‘for’ climate change 
(Fig. 1).  In this scan path, circles represent individual fixations on words, with larger 
circles representing longer fixation durations. Lines between circles represent 
saccadic eye movement behaviour.  The text of the ‘for’ and ‘against’ arguments were 
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grouped into Areas of Interest (AOI).  We measured fixation count, fixation duration 
and dwell times to ‘for’ arguments; and to ‘against’ arguments for both optimists and 
non-optimists (see Fig. 2).  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
a) optimist                                                         b)      non-optimist 
 
Figure 1: An individual scan path of a) an optimist and b) a non-optimist, as they 
read one argument ‘against’ climate change (first paragraph) and one argument 
‘for’ climate change (second paragraph).  
 
 
 
Figure 2 displays hotspot analysis of eye gaze fixations of the group of 
optimists and non-optimists reading arguments ‘against’ or ‘for’ climate change.  In 
this figure, greater intensity represents longer dwell times at fixated locations.  
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a)      optimist                                         b)      non-optimists 
a) optimists                                                        b)      non-optimists 
 
Figure 2: A hotspot analysis of eye gaze fixations of a group of optimists and 
non-optimists reading one argument against climate change (first paragraph) 
and one argument for climate change (second paragraph) .  
 
We found no significant correlation between level of dispositional optimism 
and the number of fixations to either ‘for’ or ‘against’ arguments (see Table 1). 
However, there was a significant correlation between optimism and average fixation 
duration to ‘for’ arguments only (r = -.327, p < 0.05).  Optimism level was also 
significantly negatively correlated with average dwell time to both ‘for’ (r = -.369, p 
<0.05) and ‘against’ arguments (r = -.347, p < 0.05).  In other words, higher levels of 
dispositional optimism are associated with less time spent attending to the content of 
the climate change articles irrespective of argument (‘for’ or ‘against’), and shorter 
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periods of time fixating on aspects of the arguments ‘for’ climate change (the bad 
news sections of the articles).  See Tables 1 and 2. 
 
 
 
Table 1:, Means and correlation coefficients for fixation count, fixation duration and 
overall dwell time – arguments for climate change 
 
 Optimists Mean Non-optimists 
Mean 
Correlation 
optimism 
level/gaze 
measures 
Fixation count 
 
69.2 74.9 -0.220 
Fixation duration 
(ms) 
194.2 212.7 -0.327* 
Overall dwell time 
(s) 
13.3 15.9 -0.369* 
Note. 0 = Pessimists, 1 = Optimists. * = p < .05 
 
 
 
Table 2: Means and correlation coefficients for fixation count, fixation duration and 
overall dwell time – arguments against climate change 
 
 Optimists Mean Non-optimists 
Mean 
Correlation 
optimism 
level/gaze 
measures 
Fixation count 
 
67.7 
 
74.2 
 
-0.253 
 
Fixation duration 
(ms) 
198.2 
 
211.7 
 
-0.232 
 
Overall dwell time 
(s) 
13.3 
 
15.9 
 
-0.347* 
 
Note. 0 = Pessimists, 1 = Optimists. * = p < .05 
 
 
An 2*2 ANOVA revealed no significant relationship between optimism level 
and fixation count. The interaction between argument and optimism was also not 
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significant (see Figure 3), indicating that the fixation counts to ‘for’ and ‘against’ 
arguments were similar for optimists and non-optimists. 
An 2*2 ANOVA also revealed that there was no significant relationship 
between optimism level and fixation duration, but there was a significant interaction 
effect between optimism (optimist/non-optimist) and fixation duration F(1,40) = 
5.804, p < 0.05 (see Figure 4). The two groups significantly differed on fixation 
durations to ‘for’ arguments (t(40) = 2.188, p < 0.05), but did not differ in fixation 
durations to ‘against’ arguments (t(40) = 1.506, p = .140).  Furthermore, for optimists, 
fixation durations were significantly shorter to ‘for’ arguments (M = 194.22, SD = 
33.73), than to ‘against’ arguments (M = 198.24, SD = 35.69), t(21) = -2.516, p < 
0.05.  Non-optimists, on the other hand, had very similar fixation durations to both 
types of climate change argument.  
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There was also a significant main effect of optimism on dwell time, F(1,40) = 
6.013, p < 0.05 (see Figure 5).  Analysis of mean scores revealed that non-optimists 
had significantly greater dwell times to both types of arguments than optimists. 
However, the interaction between argument and optimism was not significant, 
indicating that the dwell times to ‘for’ and ‘against’ arguments were similar for both 
optimists and non-optimists.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Mean number of fixations for optimists and non-optimists reading 
arguments ‘for’ or ‘against’ climate change 
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Figure 4: Mean fixation duration for optimists and non-optimists reading 
arguments ‘for’ or ‘against’ climate change 
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Figure 5: Mean dwell time for optimists and non-optimists reading arguments 
‘for’ or ‘against’ climate change 
 
 
Recall 
When participants were asked to summarise the articles, non-optimists 
recalled more propositional units ‘for’ climate change (mean=5.80; S.D.=2.66) than 
optimists (mean=5.30; S.D.=2.00).  However, using a t test, we found that this 
difference was not significant  t(18)=.475, p=.640.  Similarly, non-optimists recalled 
more propositional units ‘against’ climate change (median=7.00) than optimists 
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(median=6.50).  But again, this difference was not significant (U=37.50, z=-.960, 
p=.356).   Non-optimists seemed to recall more propositional units than optimists, but 
not significantly so.  The high standard deviations here were undoubtedly a factor  
However, propositional recall is only one aspect of memory performance.  Another 
critical aspect of memory is what has been termed ‘effort after meaning’ (Bartlett 
1932).  When people recall accounts from memory they make sense of what they have 
heard, and frame the discourse in particular ways in the light of their own cognitions, 
emotions and cultural views (Bower 1978; Storbeck and Clore 2005).  Hence, a good 
deal can be learnt from an analysis of how accounts from memory are constructed and 
how these constructions function (Beattie and Doherty 1995; Edwards 1997: 
Edwards, Potter and Middleton 1992).  No significant differences in level of 
‘propositional’ recall might disguise very important differences in how the recall is 
constructed and framed.  When one is asked to summarise articles about climate 
change in which both the arguments for and against climate change are included, there 
is considerable scope for differing constructions of gist (Bransford and Franks 1972).  
We decided to consider this issue in detail, and employed three broad categories for 
coding how these recalled accounts were framed:  
(1) ‘For’: the account was framed as being primarily about the 
evidence for climate change (and its general or specific effects on 
flooding, food scarcity and conflict etc.) and the role of human 
activity in this. 
(2) ‘Against’: the account was framed primarily in terms of there not 
really being a strong link between human activity and climate 
change (or its specific effects), or doubts about the very existence 
of climate change. 
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(3) Debate: the account was framed as primarily being a debate 
between two opposing positions. 
 
For example - 
‘For’: 
‘This article is about global warming and how 95% of it is due to human activity.’  
‘It was about an IPCC report about climate change saying that Britain is going to be 
subjected to a lot more flooding in the future…’ 
‘Against’: 
‘So again the IPCC have been kind of criticized for some errors in their reports.’ 
‘Climate change could result in extreme weather, such as flooding, and how there is 
not really a strong link to this.’ 
Debate: 
‘This one’s looking at….whether climate change can be explained by human 
behaviour – so there are arguments going backwards and forwards.’ 
‘It’s about climate change, about trying to understand what’s happening with the 
weather and there are different points of view.’ 
 
The frames are summarised in Tables 3 to 8 below.  We exclude any 
interpersonal comments at the start of the account or meta-comments about the task 
itself e.g. ‘sorry um um um sorry….I had it a second ago and now it’s gone’, ‘no 
problem’ in response to being asked to summarise the article, or ‘I struggle to think of 
this one now’.  Two coders independently coded the gist of the recall, blind to 
whether they had been generated by an optimist or non-optimist.  This was done for 
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all three articles.  Cohen’s kappa in the coding was 0.88, which is regarded as highly 
satisfactory (anything above 0.70 is regarded as satisfactory).     
 
Table 3: The framing of the recall narratives of optimists for the general article 
about climate change. 
 
OPTIMISTS (General) 
Optimism 
score 
Frame Coding: 
for/against/debate 
15 This article is concerned with the debate…  Debate 
16 This article is about global warming and how 
95% of it is due to human activity  
For 
16 It was showing both sides of the debate about 
whether humans are affecting global warming…  
Debate 
17 This was about climate change and looking at 
whether it was humans that were 
responsible…discounted through possibly 
inaccurate data… 
Against 
18 They were saying that climate change is 
primarily due to human living....but there could 
be an error in these studies.  
Debate 
19 This one’s looking at….whether climate change 
can be explained by human behaviour – so there 
are arguments going backwards and forwards.  
Debate 
19 The IPCC keep putting forward warnings ...but 
they are countered by sceptics'… 
Debate 
19 That article was about climate change and was 
debating the controversy…  
 
Debate 
21 It is a discussion about how true all the reports 
are about the humans impact on the climate 
change…  
Debate 
22 It was talking more about greenhouse gases, 
climate change and about how humans are to 
blame based on their lifestyles…  
For 
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Table 4: The framing of the recall narratives of non-optimists for the general 
article about climate change. 
 
 
NON-OPTIMISTS (General) 
Optimism 
score 
Frame Coding: 
for/against/debate 
7 It was about an IPCC report about climate change 
saying that Britain is going to be subjected to a lot 
more flooding in the future…  
For 
8 It is about whether or not human beings are actually 
the cause behind climate change...  
Debate 
10 It is a report from the IPCC again saying about 
human contribution to climate change and how they 
think it is 95% certain that it is humans that are 
causing climate change 
For 
11 It was climate change, but more from the scientists' 
perspective and how there is a difference between 
the sceptics and pro-greenhouse believers.  
Debate 
11 So what they’re saying is that the global greenhouse 
emissions and people’s behaviour has a high effect 
on the atmosphere.  
For 
12 It’s about climate change, about trying to 
understand what’s happening with the weather and 
there are different points of view. 
Debate 
 
12 So this one’s looking at the claim the IPCC make 
about human behaviour is the key culprit of climate 
change.  
For 
13 It was talking about the fact that global warming is 
basically by humans.  
For 
13 It was about climate change, it talked about how- 
more to do with natural aspects…global warming is 
due to political and economical…  
For 
14 ...discussed the effects of humans on global 
warming; it was 95% certain that they did have an 
effect.  
For 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
35 
 
Table 5: The framing of the recall narratives of optimists for the article about flooding 
caused by climate change. 
 
 
OPTIMISTS (Flooding) 
Optimism 
score 
Frame Coding: 
for/against/debate 
15 …there were different arguments given, suggesting 
that changes in global warming …global warming 
contributes to changes in the weather 
Debate 
16 …global warming is having an effect on the floods 
and the extreme weather. 
For 
16 That one was about the weather affecting Britain 
and how we should start preparing for more 
extreme storms because of climate change. 
For 
17 It was looking at the effect of climate change on the 
weather that we have experienced in this country 
for the last few years. 
For 
18 Climate change could result in extreme weather, 
such as flooding, and how there is not really a 
strong link to this. 
Against 
19 The U.K. has been warned to accept greater 
flooding and storms as a direct effect of climate 
change caused by the burning of fossil fuels – 
however, the computer models they use for rainfall 
are not as accurate as computer models for 
temperature change so not absolutely sure they can 
trust it. 
Debate 
19 It is a debate about the causes of climate change 
and it has come to light because of the recent 
storms over the last winter period… 
Debate 
19 Again, that was about the debate over climate 
change climate. 
Debate 
21 …it seems to be some confusion as to whether it is 
caused by human intervention, the burning of fossil 
fuels or whether that is having an effect on the 
heavy rainfall we have been experiencing. 
Debate 
22 So it was talking about any evidence about global 
warming….there was also some debate about 
whether it is actually climate change 
 
 
Debate 
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Table 6: The framing of the recall narratives of non-optimists for the article about 
flooding caused by climate change. 
 
 
NON-OPTIMISTS (Flooding) 
Optimism 
score 
Frame Coding: 
for/against/debate 
7 It was about an IPCC report about climate change 
saying that Britain is going to be subjected to a lot 
more flooding in the future. 
For 
8 It was about climate change, which they said that it 
was quite a new area of science so there is not an 
exact correlation between the rise in greenhouse 
gasses and the things like the floods 
Debate 
10 It was about a report on climate change and the 
recent flooding this winter in the U.K. and the fact 
that the scientists couldn’t actually say whether it 
was due to global climate change. 
Debate 
11 Climate change again but more specific to the UK 
and the flooding and the weather conditions that 
happen here, I remember it saying that you cannot 
completely attribute it to human causality. 
Debate 
11 Very conflicting – scientists either some knowing 
or some believe in that it is due to fossils, climate 
change and some think it is the jet stream. 
Debate 
12 So it’s looking at climate change and global 
warming and it’s coming from the IPPC report 
which the U.N. did.  It says that small countries, 
and I think it said Asia as well, are more likely to 
be affected by extreme weather conditions. 
For 
12 So again the IPCC have been kind of criticized for 
some errors in their reports  
Against 
13 It was talking about climate change and how 
they’re blaming the recent storms that we had on 
climate change. 
For 
13 It was on climate change – it discussed climate 
change in relation to the weather talking about 
flooding and heat waves – there was a lot of 
argument whether the floods in Britain were 
associated with global warming and climate 
change. 
Debate 
14 It was talking about another IPCC report and the 
effects of global warming on severe weather fronts, 
in particular the effects on smaller islands like the 
UK discussing whether the increased rainfall over, 
especially the last winter was a result of global 
warming. 
For 
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Table 7: The framing of recall narratives of optimists for the article about food 
scarcity and conflict resulting from climate change. 
 
 
OPTIMISTS (Food Scarcity and Conflict) 
Optimism 
score 
Frame Coding: 
for/against/debate 
15 The article is concerned with climate change and its 
effects on conflict and global politics, and gave 
various different arguments as to what the 
relationship actually entails, if at all. 
Debate 
16 Wasn’t it looking at climate change effects in 
different areas and they had noticed that people, 
like gang leaders sort of using it to control food. 
For 
16 This article says that the IPCC says that due to the 
case of global warming there is going to be an 
increase of violent attacks because different 
countries don’t often have the resources available to 
feed their country. 
For 
17 This is a debate about whether climate change 
could cause conflicts because there could be a 
shortage of food and water, so it could cause a 
conflict. 
Debate 
18 Some people are saying that climate change could 
lead to conflict. 
For 
19 It’s another United Nations IPCC report and it is 
looking at and trying to link climate change to 
conflict. 
Debate 
19 There is an argument in the United States that 
climate change affecting food sources will result in 
greater conflict because people will be fighting over 
food and water…the counterargument would be… 
Debate 
19 The IPCC report was explaining that there might be 
a correlation between climate change and conflict 
and poverty, possibly, in the next 10 years due to 
climate change - however, other people and 
scholars were arguing there is no direct, causal 
influence between those two factors. 
Debate 
21 It is a report from the IPCC discussing how climate 
change might well be responsible for acts of 
violence and general unrest in countries. – there’s 
some discussion about whether that in itself… 
Debate 
22 This one was talking about the effects of climate 
change on conflict and also on food production and 
things like that – so saying about how potentially 
changing conflict might be a result of climate 
change…but it good be a good thing. 
Debate 
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Table 8: The framing of recall narratives of non-optimists for the article about food 
scarcity and conflict resulting from climate change. 
 
 
 
NON-OPTIMISTS (Food scarcity and Conflict) 
Optimism 
score 
Frame Coding: 
for/against/debate 
7 This was another report about global climate 
change saying that the food will be more scarce, 
saying basically food and water will be more scarce 
and maybe even people like warlords will come 
into play here. 
For 
8 This one was about how climate change could 
affect the amount of food and water we’ve got – 
some people were arguing that it would actually do 
well for countries like Asia and things like wheat 
production will go up, but for the rest of the country 
it could mean a decrease in food and water supplies. 
For 
10 The IPCC to say that climate change will decrease 
food supply. 
For 
11 A general report on the effects of climate change 
and what will happen in politics, agriculture, and 
the possibility of war breaking out – not war – but 
conflict. 
For 
11 Basically, what they are saying is that climate 
change can either make people react positively or 
negatively and create conflict throughout the world. 
For 
12 The global climate may be impacting on the 
scarcity of foods and affecting the growth… 
For 
12 So this one was looking at conflict as an outcome of 
climate change with the IPCC report claiming that 
an increase in climate change will lead to an 
increase in conflict as people will fight over 
resources and water. 
For 
13 It was talking about global warming could affect 
people in other ways other than, like, death and 
destruction – it could affect them in the food sector. 
For 
13 It said that global warming is often more to do with 
political and economical issues – it can have a 
negative effect. 
For 
14 Another IPCC report on climate change and food 
scarcity and whether this could lead to war and 
conflict in areas where there was this food scarcity - 
the converse argument was that most conflict was 
due to power, terror, money. 
Debate 
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Tables 3 to 8 are summarised in the contingency table below, which collapses 
the three types of article. It is immediately apparent that the non-optimists were most 
likely to frame their recall in terms of the arguments for climate change (‘this article 
is about global warming and how 95% of it is due to human activity).  66.7% of their 
recalls were framed in this way.  The optimists, on the other hand, were most likely to 
frame it in terms of a debate between two opposing positions (‘it’s about climate 
change, about trying to understand what’s happening with the weather and there are 
different points of view’).  66.7% of their recalls were framed as a debate.  There 
were few summaries of the content framed in terms of the arguments ‘against’ climate 
change for either groups (only 5% of the total).  A X2 test revealed that optimists and 
non-optimists differed significantly in the framing of their recalls (‘for’ versus 
‘against’/debate) – X2 (1) =13.42, p=0.001 (2-tailed). 
 
Table 9: A summary of the framing of recall narratives about climate change (‘for’, 
‘against’ or ‘debate’) for optimists and non-optimists. 
 
 For Against  Debate 
Optimists 8 2 20 
Non-optimists 20 1 9 
Totals 28 3 29 
 
In summary, it would appear that those higher in dispositional 
optimism (with scores ranging from 17-22) spend less time fixating on arguments 
‘for’ climate change than on arguments ‘against’ climate change.  Non-optimists (with 
scores ranging from 3-14), on the other hand, had very similar fixation durations to 
both types of climate change arguments. Non-optimists also had significantly greater 
dwell times to both types of arguments than optimists.  Optimists are also more likely 
to frame their recall of articles about climate change (in which arguments ‘for’ and 
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‘against’ climate change are included) as a ‘debate’, whilst non-optimists are more 
likely to frame their recalls as being about the arguments for climate change. 
The next important question is whether dispositional optimism could be linked 
to level of optimism bias?  Our prediction, following Sharot et al. (2011), is that it 
would. 
  
Study 2: 
Method 
Participants were a sample of university staff (administrative and support 
staff) from the North West of England taking part in a staff development course.  
They were asked to take part in a survey to measure dispositional optimism and 
possible optimism bias.  The 10-item Life Orientation Test - Revised (LOT-R) was 
again used to measure dispositional optimism.  A questionnaire was devised to 
measure optimism bias.  It consisted of three broad questions: 
1. What is the probability of you personally being affected by climate 
change? 
2. What proportion of people (living today) will be affected by 
climate change? 
3. What proportion of future generations will be affected by climate 
change? 
 
Participants had to write a number between 0 and 100% in response to 
each of the questions.  Each question had seven additional questions asking 
participants to rate (in the case of question 1) the probability of them being 
personally affected by severe drought, severe flooding, major threats to 
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infrastructure, food shortages, major conflict, heat-related increased mortality 
and major disruption to your life.  In the case of the other questions, they had 
to rate the proportion of people living today (question 2) being affected by 
each of these, and then the proportion of future generations (question 3) being 
affected by them.  There were thus 24 questions in all to assess possible 
optimism bias.  There was no financial incentive for taking part, and it was 
stressed that participation was entirely voluntary and anonymous.  The sample 
of 50 participants was 84.0% female, the ages ranged between 22-64. The 
research had been passed by the Departmental Research Ethics Committee 
(DREC).   
 
Results: 
We split our participants into 3 groups – ‘high’ (optimism score 18-23), 
‘medium’ (optimism score 15-17) and low (optimism score 8-14).  In Study 1, the 
median split distinguished optimists (scores 17-22) and non-optimists (scores 3-14).  
A score of 14 and below identified an N of 17 in the lowest category in Study 2, so we 
decided to divide the remaining 33 participants into 2 categories (high and medium 
optimists). 
Tables 10-12 show the estimates for all 3 groups on the various questions.  It 
seems that those participants lowest in dispositional optimism (i.e. the most 
pessimistic) are more likely to judge that they will be personally affected by climate 
change than those highest in dispositional optimism.  In addition, they judge that more 
people living today will be affected by climate change, and that future generations 
will be more likely to be affected by climate change, compared to those highest in 
optimism.  Indeed, those lowest in dispositional optimism were approximately twice 
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as likely than the optimists to think that they would be personally be affected by 
climate change across all eight responses averaged.  
  
Table 10: Mean estimates for participants varying in level of dispositional optimism 
for question 1. 
 
Question 1 High 
Optimists 
(optimism 
score: 18-23) 
n=17 
Medium 
Optimists 
(optimism 
score: 15-17) 
n=16  
Low 
Optimists 
(optimism 
score: 8-14) 
n=17 
Q1.1: What is the probability of you 
personally being affected by climate 
change? 
36.5 51.3 56.8 
Q1.2: What is the probability of you 
personally being affected by severe 
drought because of climate change? 
10.3 18.1 29.4 
Q1.3: What is the probability of you 
personally being affected by severe 
flooding because of climate change? 
18.2 22.6 38.8 
Q1.4: What is the probability of you 
personally being affected by food 
shortages because of climate change? 
18.6 24.3 29.1 
Q1.5: What is the probability of you 
personally being affected by food 
shortages because of climate change? 
19.9 25.4 27.9 
Q1.6: What is the probability of you 
personally being affected by major 
conflict over natural resources because 
of climate change? 
19.8 31.8 35.4 
Q1.7: What is the probability of you 
personally being affected by heat-
related increased mortality because of 
climate change? 
13.9 19.0 38.4 
Q1.8: What is the probability of you 
personally suffering major disruption 
to your life because of climate change? 
12.8 20.3 39.8 
Overall mean 18.8 26.6 37.0 
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Table 11: Mean estimates for participants varying in level of dispositional optimism 
for question 2. 
 
Question 2 High 
optimists 
Medium 
optimists 
Low 
optimists 
Q 2.1: What proportion of people 
living today will be affected by climate 
change? 
52.8 
 
75.3 68.5 
Q 2.2: What proportion of people 
living today will be affected by severe 
drought because of climate change? 
38.5 49.7 52.1 
Q 2.3: What proportion of people 
living today will be affected by severe 
flooding because of climate change? 
38.4 47.8 51.2 
Q 2.4: What proportion of people 
living today will be affected by major 
threats to infrastructure because of 
climate change? 
39.0 46.3 47.9 
Q 2.5: What proportion of people 
living today will be affected by food 
shortages because of climate change? 
44.9 46.6 51.8 
Q 2.6: What proportion of people 
living today will be affected by major 
conflict over natural resources because 
of climate change? 
35.1 46.3 50.9 
Q 2.7: What proportion of people 
living today will be affected by heat-
related increased mortality because of 
climate change? 
32.0 40.0 48.2 
Q 2.8: What proportion of people 
living today will suffer major 
disruption to their life because of 
climate change? 
32.8 45.9 58.2 
Overall means 39.2 49.7 47.6 
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Table 12: Mean estimates for participants varying in level of dispositional optimism 
for question 3.  
 
Question 3 High 
optimists 
Medium 
optimists 
Low 
optimists 
Q 3.1: What proportion of future 
generations will be affected by climate 
change? 
76.4 88.1 84.1 
Q 3.2: What proportion of future 
generations will be affected by severe 
drought because of climate change? 
56.8 54.1 69.4 
Q 3.3: What proportion of future 
generations will be affected by severe 
flooding because of climate change? 
54.4 53.8 69.4 
Q 3.4: What proportion of future 
generations will be affected by major 
threats to infrastructure because of 
climate change? 
56.2 53.1 67.9 
Q 3.5: What proportion of future 
generations will be affected by food 
shortages because of climate change? 
59.4 52.8 68.2 
Q 3.6: What proportion of future 
generations will be affected by major 
conflict over natural resources because 
of climate change? 
61.2 56.3 65.9 
Q 3.7: What proportion of future 
generations will be affected by heat-
related increased mortality because of 
climate change? 
55.2 53.6 59.4 
Q 3.8: What proportion of future 
generations will suffer major 
disruption to their life because of 
climate change? 
57.9 55.4 74.1 
Overall means 59.7 58.4 69.8 
 
 
 
Non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests were used to compare the estimates of 
the participants highest and lowest in dispositional optimism.  The Mann-Whitney U 
values and the significance levels are detailed in tables 13-15.  One-tailed tests were 
used throughout because the direction of difference was predicted – those highest in 
dispositional optimism were predicted to show the highest level of optimism bias 
(following Sharot et al. 2011).  In the case of whether our participants thought that 
they personally would be affected by aspects of climate change, 6 out of 8 questions 
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yielded a significant effect (at the 0.05 level of significance) for level of dispositional 
optimism (highest versus lowest tertile), including the most general question (‘What is 
the probability of you personally being affected by climate change’).  In the case of 
their estimates of people living today, again 6 out of 8 questions yielded a significant 
effect for optimism level, again including the general question (‘What proportion of 
people living today will be affected by climate change?’).  In the case of their 
estimates of future generations, only 1 of the 8 questions revealed a significant effect 
for optimism level.  It would seem that all of our participants, regardless of optimism 
level, were fairly pessimistic about the future.  Our dispositional optimists were, 
however, much more optimistic about the present, as revealed by their answers 
throughout questions 1 and 2. 
It has been argued that when multiple comparisons are carried out we increase 
the likelihood of incorrectly rejecting a null hypothesis (a Type 1 error) and 
consequently need to apply the Bonferroni correction.  A ! next to the outcome of the 
test indicates whether the results are still significant when this correction is made.  
This procedure is considered very conservative.  It yields a much smaller set of 
statistically significant results, which interestingly only now occur in response to 
Question 1.  In other words, dispositional optimists differ from non-optimists only in 
terms of whether they think that they personally will be affected by climate change.    
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Table 13: Mann-Whitney U test comparing high optimists and low optimists 
(Question 1). 
 
 
High Optimists v Low Optimists 
 
 Question Mann-Whitney U test 
Q1.1 What is the probability of you 
personally being affected by climate 
change? 
U=90.5, p=0.031 (1-tailed)* 
Q1.2 What is the probability of you 
personally being affected by severe 
drought because of climate change? 
U=88.5, p=0.026 (1-tailed)* 
Q1.3  What is the probability of you 
personally being affected by severe 
flooding because of climate change? 
U=92.0, p=0.034 (1-tailed)* 
Q1.4 What is the probability of you 
personally being affected by food 
shortages because of climate change? 
U=110.5, p=0.123 (1-tailed) 
Q1.5 What is the probability of you 
personally being affected by food 
shortages because of climate change? 
U=111.5, p=0.130 (1-tailed) 
Q1.6 What is the probability of you 
personally being affected by major 
conflict over natural resources 
because of climate change? 
U=89.5, p=0.029 (1-tailed)* 
Q1.7 What is the probability of you 
personally being affected by heat-
related increased mortality because of 
climate change? 
U=68.5, p=0.004 (1-tailed)*! 
Q1.8 What is the probability of you 
personally suffering major disruption 
to your life because of climate 
change? 
U=68.0, p=0.004 (1-tailed)*! 
* represents a statistically significant result.   
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Table 14: Mann-Whitney U test statistical analyses comparing high optimists and low 
optimists (Question 2). 
 
 
 
High Optimists v Low Optimists 
 
 Question Mann-Whitney U test 
Q 2.1 What proportion of people living 
today will be affected by climate 
change? 
U=94.0, p=0.041 (1-tailed)* 
Q 2.2 What proportion of people living 
today will be affected by severe 
drought because of climate change? 
U=90.0, p=0.029 (1-tailed)* 
Q 2.3 What proportion of people living 
today will be affected by severe 
flooding because of climate change? 
U=94.0, p=0.041 (1-tailed)* 
Q 2.4 What proportion of people living 
today will be affected by major threats 
to infrastructure because of climate 
change? 
U=113.0, p=0.140 (1-tailed) 
Q 2.5 What proportion of people living 
today will be affected by food 
shortages because of climate change? 
U=116.0, p=0.166 (1-tailed) 
Q 2.6 What proportion of people living 
today will be affected by major 
conflict over natural resources 
because of climate change? 
U=86.5, p=0.022 (1-tailed)* 
Q 2.7 What proportion of people living 
today will be affected by heat-related 
increased mortality because of climate 
change? 
U=74.5, p=0.007 (1-tailed)* 
Q 2.8 What proportion of people living 
today will suffer major disruption to 
their life because of climate change? 
U=82.5, p=0.015 (1-tailed)* 
* represents a statistically significant result 
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Table 15: Mann-Whitney U test statistical analyses comparing high optimists and low 
optimists (Question 3). 
 
 
High Optimists v Low Optimists 
 
 Question Mann-Whitney U test 
Q 3.1 What proportion of future 
generations will be affected by 
climate change? 
U=131.5, p=0.322 (1-tailed) 
Q 3.2 What proportion of future 
generations will be affected by 
severe drought because of climate 
change? 
U=101.5, p=0.069 (1-tailed) 
Q 3.3 What proportion of future 
generations will be affected by 
severe flooding because of climate 
change? 
U=90.5, p=0.029 (1-tailed)* 
Q 3.4  What proportion of future 
generations will be affected by 
major threats to infrastructure 
because of climate change? 
U=104.5, p=0.085 (1-tailed) 
Q 3.5  What proportion of future 
generations will be affected by 
food shortages because of climate 
change? 
U=112.0, p=0.133 (1-tailed) 
Q 3.6 What proportion of future 
generations will be affected by 
major conflict over natural 
resources because of climate 
change? 
U=286.0, p=0.350 (1-tailed) 
Q 3.7  What proportion of future 
generations will be affected by 
heat-related increased mortality 
because of climate change? 
U=124.5, p=0.249 (1-tailed) 
Q 3.8 What proportion of future 
generations will suffer major 
disruption to their life because of 
climate change? 
U=104.0, p=0.081 (1-tailed) 
* represents a statistically significant result 
! represents a statistically significant result after applying the Bonferroni correction.  
 
 
Discussion 
There is consternation amongst politicians, the CEOs of multinationals and 
major NGOs (including the IPCC) that many members of the public are not getting 
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the message about climate change.  Many government campaigns, it would seem, 
have been largely ignored.  There have been many attempts to explain this over the 
past few years, including Marshall (2015) who considers a wide range of possible 
explanations.  One explanation that he considers is the well-known cognitive bias 
found in many aspects of life referred to as the ‘optimism bias’.  Many of us 
(estimated at around 80%) do apparently suffer from some form of this bias (Sharot 
2012).  We believe that our marriages will work (Baker and Emery 1993), our 
businesses will succeed (Bracha and Brown 2012), and that we will have a long and 
fulfilling life compared to everyone else (Weinstein 1980).  This sort of unrealistic 
optimism would seem to be pervasive, affecting not just our personal relationships but 
also our attitudes to finance, work and health.  It has also been found across a range of 
environmental issues (Gifford et al. 2009), as well as in estimates of the risk of health 
damage from specific environmental hazards, like water pollution (Pahl at al. 2005). 
Gifford et al. (2009) reported that individuals believe that across a number of 
environmental issues they are safer than others living elsewhere (‘spatial bias’) and 
that they are safer than future generations (‘temporal bias’).  Marshall (2015) attempts 
to use the concept of ‘optimism bias’ as an explanatory resource.  If you think that 
climate change will not affect you personally, and that your own neighbourhood will 
be relatively safe, then there is less urgency in fundamentally changing your 
behaviour to mitigate the effects of climate change. 
However, we took a somewhat different perspective on this issue.  We began 
by recognising that optimism bias is a form of biased cognition, essentially the 
product of various social and cognitive processes (rather than an actual process per 
se).  We attempted to determine what processes could potentially contribute to this 
type of bias.  One plausible hypothesis is in terms of fundamental differences in 
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personality linked to dispositional optimism.  It seems that optimists and pessimists 
differ in fundamental ways, for example, in terms of attributional reasoning (Seligman 
2002), where we attribute causality to events, as well as (possibly) in terms of 
underling patterns of perception (Isaacowitz 2006).  Both perception (‘what’) and 
attributional reasoning (‘why’) are critical steps in making sense of the world and in 
building a meaningful representation of events in it to mediate future action.  
According to Isaacowitz (2006) and Seligman (2002) optimists have distinct cognitive 
‘strategies’, involving both attention and attributional reasoning, for staying 
optimistic.  At the level of the individual this might be a very good thing because 
there is evidence that optimists live longer and healthier lives than pessimists (Harker 
and Keltner 2001; Seligman 2002), and consequently using a range of techniques 
(including CBT) people have been trained to become more optimistic. The question 
we asked was - does this have a downside?  Do optimists and non-optimists process 
climate change messages differently in terms of patterns of fixations and can this be 
linked in any way to level of optimism bias?  
We found that level of dispositional optimism does affect visual attention to 
climate change messages, containing arguments both ‘for’ and ‘against’ climate 
change.  Optimists spent less time (overall dwell time) attending to any arguments 
about climate changes (either ‘for’ or ‘against’) with substantially shorter individual 
fixations on aspects of arguments for climate change, i.e. those that reflect the 
scientific consensus but are bad news.  Previous research has shown that optimism 
bias derives partly from a failure to learn systematically from new undesirable 
information and that this bias is most pronounced with those highest in dispositional 
optimism (Sharot et al 2011).  Other research has shown that dispositional optimists 
have an unconscious, automatic attentional bias to positive rather than negative 
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stimuli (Isaacowitz 2006).  Our study suggests that this attentional bias might also 
apply when we present individuals with substantive messages about climate change.  
It also seems to affect what optimists and non-optimists recall from these messages. 
We found that when asked to summarise what they had read, non-optimists were more 
likely to frame their recall in terms of the arguments for climate change (‘this article 
is about global warming and how 95% of it is due to human activity’) with two thirds 
of their recalls being framed in this way.  Optimists, on the other hand, were 
significantly more likely to frame it in terms of a debate between two opposing 
positions (‘it’s about climate change, about trying to understand what’s happening 
with the weather and there are different points of view’) with two thirds of them 
framing their recall as a debate. 
This study suggests that many individuals are showing an attentional bias 
linked to maintaining their optimistic state when presented with climate change 
messages.  We also found that those highest in dispositional optimism had the 
strongest and most pronounced optimism bias when it came to estimating the 
probability of climate change affecting them. For example, those participants lowest 
in dispositional optimism (i.e. the most pessimistic tertile) were approximately twice 
as likely as the most optimistic group (the highest tertile) to think that they would be 
personally be affected by climate change across the eight questions put to them on this 
topic.  Our results suggested that all of our participants, regardless of optimism level, 
were relatively pessimistic about the future.  Our dispositional optimists were, 
however, much less concerned about the present, and particularly about whether 
climate change would ever impact on them personally.  
Optimism may have positive effects on our lives because underestimating the 
likelihood of future negative events can reduce our levels of stress and anxiety about 
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the future and add to our longevity.  Many people, it seems, have developed cognitive 
strategies rooted in basic brain functioning that allows them to remain optimistic 
despite evidence to the contrary.  The problem, however, is that some events really do 
need to be considered with great urgency and optimism bias can have very significant 
negative consequences particularly regarding the discounting of serious risk.  Climate 
change is one such risk. 
This experimental study opens up a number of new avenues of research.  As is 
often the case in intensive experimental research of this type, it employed a 
comparatively small number of participants from fairly narrow cultural and economic 
backgrounds, but the question of the relationship between level of dispositional 
optimism and optimism bias could easily be explored in very large samples.  In 
addition, it would be interesting to determine what differences in processing related to 
level of dispositional optimism emerge when different media are used to present the 
information (text compared with televison or film, news sources versus authored 
pieces), as well as how processing relates to the discursive organisation of the text 
itself (Potter and Wetherell 1986).        
Notwithstanding these critical points, this study has a number of potential 
general implications.  We cannot assume that members of the public are attending to 
messages about climate change in the same way (regardless of the source).  The 
underlying messages may not be getting through because of inherent cognitive biases 
designed to sustain mood state.  This new research suggests that we must pay some 
regard to these biases in designing our communicational strategies about climate 
change.  It may well not be enough simply to publicise the scientific evidence about 
climate change (and the cataclysmic predictions for the future) without framing it in a 
more optimistic way to highlight the positive aspects of mitigation strategies 
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(Bardwell 1991; Davis 1995).  A more positive overall frame highlighting possible 
solutions, interwoven throughout the message, should increase both feelings of self-
efficacy and visual attention to the underlying message.  Without this, we have the 
grave danger that many will selectively attend to the information that we are 
presenting, and ultimately show little behavioural adaptation or concern about the 
underlying issue. 
There is something else that we might need to consider. For the past few 
decades, we have been striving to increase optimism particularly in Western societies 
because of its health benefits (through both positive psychology and a cultural 
emphasis on ‘the power of positive thinking’).  Some have argued that we have now 
managed to produce a profound socio-psychological change in Western societies with 
unrealistic expectations about the future (Ehrenreich 2009).  Ehrenreich has argued 
that this has actually ‘undermined preparedness’ to deal with real threats like global 
terrorism, financial bubbles, or climate change, with the public having ‘no ability or 
inclination to imagine the worst’ (Ehrenreich 2009: 11).   Optimism can be a very 
positive thing, but it clearly has its limits.  Over-optimism can be very damaging 
indeed.  Perhaps, it is time to re-evaluate this over-arching cultural focus and consider 
new ways to train the public to imagine worst case scenarios including climate change 
(whilst still allowing people to feel positive about the possibility of change).  We 
clearly do need to simultaneously spell out things that people can do to mitigate the 
effects of climate change.  That way the message is not uniformly negative, rather 
within it there are the elements of hope that many people crave.  
We need to remember that for many human beings the regulation and 
maintenance of their positive mood state is a core part of how they process any 
message.  They have developed a number of cognitive strategies to allow them to do 
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this.  These strategies will be rooted in automatic processing (Kahneman 2011; 
Beattie 2012) so we need to think carefully about how to construct climate change 
warnings that can influence these fast, automatic processes.  The general conclusion 
of this research, however, is very simple - we need everybody to see the clear and 
present danger of climate change, even though many people, it would seem, have 
developed ways to prevent this very thing happening.  We need to be aware of this 
and redesign our communications appropriately.  Then, and only then, will our 
messages get through.  
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Climate change – general   
There has been a lot of heated discussion lately of the role of human beings in 
climate change. Climate change sceptics argue that even if the planet is warming up, 
it is not clear that it is because of human behaviour. They point out errors in previous 
United Nations IPCC reports and accuse the global warming ‘industry’ of ratcheting 
up the risks of climate change, which have subsequently led to the cripplingly 
expensive introduction of green energy policies.  
But the arguments that climate change is caused by humans are considered by 
many to be convincing. The latest United Nations IPCC report, published in 2014, 
confirms that climate scientists appear more certain than ever before that human 
behaviour is the key culprit for global warming. Based on all scientific evidence, the 
report concluded it was 95% likely that the rise in global temperatures were due to 
human activity, such as greenhouse gas emissions and deforestation. 
Previous IPCC reports on climate impact have been plagued by errors that have 
damaged the body’s credibility. Most famously, in the 2007 report, it said that 
glaciers in the Himalayas could disappear by 2035, a claim it has since withdrawn. 
One reason for errors in the IPCC reports could be the over-reliance on computer 
models of predicted data, rather than on physical science.  
The recent IPCC report raised the threat of climate change to a whole new level -
based on new scientific evidence - warning of sweeping consequences to life and 
livelihood. The report concluded climate change is already having detrimental effects 
– melting sea ice in the Arctic, killing off coral reefs in the oceans, and leading to 
heat waves, heavy rains and mega-disasters. And the worst was yet to come. 
But sceptics say almost every global environmental scare of the past half century 
has been exaggerated - from the population "bomb," pesticides and acid rain, to the 
ozone hole, genetically engineered crops and killer bees. In every case, sceptics 
argue, scientists gain a lot of funding from these scares and before quietly agreeing 
that the problem wasn’t that bad; global warming is no different.  
Climate scientists say this is irrelevant. The good news from the IPCC report is that 
many of consequences of climate change can be reduced by cutting greenhouse gas 
emissions. The IPCC report states with high confidence that risks associated with 
rising global temperatures – such as water scarcity, sea-level rise, heat waves, and 
floods - can be reduced by cutting human greenhouse gas emissions. 
A: Climate change in general  
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B: Climate change and its relation to flooding in the UK 
 
Climate change – Flooding   
The recent United Nations IPCC report on climate change stated extreme weather 
patterns, including a higher risk of flooding, are a consequence of rising greenhouse 
gas emissions - with Europe, Asia and small island states highlighted as being 
particularly vulnerable. An author of the latest IPCC report warned, “Britain should 
brace itself for a rise in floods, heatwaves and coastal storms. The UK is likely to 
face a growing number of extreme weather events as a result of global warming”. 
However, attributing extreme weather events to human influence is only an emerging 
area of research, and is acknowledged by climate scientists to be extremely 
challenging. Computer models used to explore the impacts of different levels of 
greenhouse gases are weaker on rainfall than on temperature. For example, 
“Climate and weather is an extraordinarily complex new form of science. I don’t 
blame the climate scientists for not knowing the answers”, said one senior politician. 
But some do clearly believe that the flooding experienced in England this winter was 
a consequence of climate change. "What we've seen this winter with the floods is 
consistent with what we would expect to see in a changing climate," said an leading 
academic. “The floods in Britain, and other weather-related disasters on Earth, are 
clear indications of the effects of global warming caused by the uncontrolled burning 
of fossil fuels”.  
Yet, others insist that there is no link between the storms that have battered England 
this winter and global warming. The UK Environment Secretary did not say whether 
the the winter floods were caused by climate change. This argument is supported by 
a UK academic who said, “Scientists just don’t know whether the persistence of the 
rainfall this winter was due to climate change or not”.  
But, the record rainfall and storms that caused flooding this winter could be part of a 
trend of unprecedented extreme weather caused by global warming according to 
some senior scientists. Four of the five wettest years recorded in the UK occurred in 
the past 14 years. Over that same period, the UK also had the seven warmest years.  
But a major factor of the extreme weather this winter was the position of the jet 
stream. A Met Office expert said, “There is no evidence that global warming can 
cause the jet stream to get stuck in the way it has this past winter. If this is due to 
climate change, it is outside scientific knowledge.” Indeed, the recent IPCC report did 
not mention that climate change had any effect on the jet stream getting stuck.  
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Climate change – food scarcity and conflict   
The recent United Nations IPCC report on climate change drew a clear line 
connecting climate change to food scarcity, and conflict. The report states that 
climate change will indirectly increase the risk of violent conflict, by increasing 
hunger and fight over resources. The leader of the World Bank agrees, “Fights over 
water and food will erupt in the next 5-10 years as a result of climate change.”  
But, not all agree with the IPCC’s conclusion. “There is no evidence that global 
warming directly increases conflict. The causes of conflict are primarily political and 
economic, not climatic. Warlords may exploit draught, flooding, starvation, or 
agricultural disasters. What drives their fight is not the rain, the temperature, or the 
sea level - but power, territory, and money” says one leading academic. 
This recent IPCC report, however, highlights that climate change had already cut into 
the global food supply. Global crop yields were beginning to decline – especially for 
wheat – raising doubts as to whether production could keep up with population 
growth. Under some scenarios, the report said, climate change could lead to 
dramatic drops in global wheat production as well as reductions in maize.  
But contradictory evidence is also available. For example, the recent United Nations 
IPCC report also states that northern parts of Asia will benefit from global warming, 
resulting in increased production of wheat and other cereals. Furthermore, satellites 
have recorded a 14% increase in greenery on the planet in the past 30 years, 
partially because of greater greenhouse gas emissions, which enable plants to grow 
faster and use less water. 
Some governments are taking this seriously and have started to investigate the 
national security implications of climate change. The US Defence Department has 
called climate change a 'threat multiplier' that could increase the risk of military 
conflict. Climate-induced crises, such as drought and mass migration, could topple 
governments, bolster terrorist movements and destabilise regions.  
However, resource scarcity might encourage cooperation. “When people face 
climate dangers or scarcity, they may decide to fight, but similarly they may decide to 
co-operate. For example, a consequence of the 2004 ‘Boxing Day’ tsunami in 
Southeast Asia was greater cooperation among states and peace in Aceh,” said a 
university researcher.  
 
C: Climate change and its consequences for food scarcity and violent conflict  
 
